Effect of the Widow\u27s Election on the Texas Inheritance Tax Statute by Erwing, Hellmut A.
SMU Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 11
1963
Effect of the Widow's Election on the Texas
Inheritance Tax Statute
Hellmut A. Erwing
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hellmut A. Erwing, Effect of the Widow's Election on the Texas Inheritance Tax Statute, 17 Sw L.J. 143 (1963)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol17/iss1/11
ninety days to one year in confinement is not in itself cruel and
unusual.
IV. CONCLUSION
The reversal of the conviction by the Court is correct, even though
the theory of the decision is questionable. The Court failed to recog-
nize that the offense and not the punishment was contrary to the
principles of justice. Society wishes to prevent crime, but in doing
so a legislature must not infringe upon individual liberty. Any
criminal sanction which is not defined in terms of conduct and which
merely assumes a causal connection between the condemned "status"
and eventual anti-social behavior does seriously threaten individual
liberty and is, therefore, a denial of due process of law. Furthermore,
any criminal statute which defines an offense in terms so vague that
the boundaries of the offense are indefinite and uncertain is also
repugnant to the due process clause. The Lanzetta" rationale should
be applied in cases like Robinson to put an end to uncertain wording
in criminal statutes.
The solution of the various problems of "status" criminality is not
simple. Nevertheless, there should be a complete revision of existing
vagrancy and addiction statutes so that all such offenses can be de-
fined in terms of acts based upon traditional principles of conduct-
causation. Before revising the statutes, however, a thorough study of
the problem of narcotics addiction in the United States and its rela-
tionship to anti-social behavior must be made in order to draft enact-
ments that will be in accord with modern concepts of treatment and
rehabilitation. Then, a return to the concept of conduct-causation
criminality will provide tangible standards that can be effectively de-
termined by the judiciary and will provide guideposts by which the
citizenry can act.
Robert Ted Enloe, III
Effect of the Widow's Election on the
Texas Inheritance Tax Statute
Decedent's will disposed of all of his separate property and the
entire community estate. Decedent's widow elected to take under the
will; she received the income for life from a testamentary trust, or
500 dollars per month, whichever was greater. The remainders were
to be divided equally between the heirs of Decedent and three rela-
88 306 U.S. 451 (1939); see notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
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tives of the widow. Upon the widow's election to take under the
will, the Texas inheritance taxi was assessed against the trustee for
the beneficiaries other than the widow. The tax was computed on
the basis of the entire community estate as well as on Decedent's
separate property. Held: When a surviving spouse elects to take
under a will which disposes of the entire community and separate
estates by leaving the income for life to the survivor and the re-
mainders to a trustee for named beneficiaries, there is no Texas in-
heritance tax liability on the survivor's share of the community
estate passing to the trustee, since such share does not "pass" under
the will for purposes of the Texas inheritance tax statute. Calvert
v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, - Tex. -, 356 S.W.2d 918 (1962).
"Historically, death duties 'in all countries rest . . . upon the
principle that death is the generating source from which the par-
ticular taxing power takes its being . . . .' "' With the exception of
Nevada, all of the states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
government have some form of death tax.3 The typical state death
tax is an inheritance tax, although some states have adopted an
estate tax or a combination of both." Since the formal subject of
1 Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1960); see also discussion note 8 infra.
Calvert v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, - Tex. -, 356 S.W.2d 918, 921 (1962), quot-
ing from Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1900); see also Tyler v. United States,
281 U.S. 497 (1930); Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 3-6 (1942); Shultz, Taxation
of Inheritance 6 (1926).
a See note 4 infra for the list of statutes. The first state inheritance tax law was "An
Act Relating to Collateral Inheritances" enacted in 1826 by Pennsylvania. Pa. Laws c. 72
(1825-1826).
As early as 1797, Congress enacted a legacy duty, 1 Stat. 527, 536 (1797), which was
repealed in 1802, 2 Stat. 148 (1802). The next federal death tax, enacted during the Civil
War, first applied to personal property only but was later extended to encompass real prop-
erty. 12 Stat. 432, 485 (1862); 13 Star. 223, 285-89 (1864); 14 Stat. 98, 140 (1866).
The present federal estate tax found in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 2001-2209,
has had a continuous history since September 8, 1916, when the Revenue Act of 1916,
39 Stat. 777-80, 1002, became effective.
" The basic difference between an "estate" tax and an "inheritance" tax is that the
former is imposed upon the decedent's estate; whereas, the latter falls upon the beneficiary's
share of the estate. Nearly all of the early state and federal death duties were inheritance
taxes. For the most recent attempt to convert the federal estate tax into an inheritance tax,
see H.R. Rep. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1935).
Only the federal government and eleven states employ the estate tax system exclusively:
Federal Government: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2001-2209; Alabama: Ala. Code tit. 51,
§§ 432-49 (1940); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Star. Ann. §§ 42-1501 to -1535 (1956); Arkansas:
Ark. Star. Ann. §§ 63-101 to -151 (1947); Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. 55 198.01-.44 (1958);
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. 5§ 92-3401 to -3404 (1933); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§
9262-99 (1942); New York: N.Y. Tax Law §5 220-45; North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code
§§ 57-37-01 to -32 (1960); Oklahoma: Okla. Star. Ann. tit. 68, §§ 988-89t (1954);
South Carolina: S.C. Code 5§ 65-451 to -529 (1952); Utah: Utah Code Ann. 5§ 59-12-1
to -44 (1953).
All other jurisdictions (except Nevada) have an inheritance tax: Alaska: Alaska Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 48-4-1 to -19 (1949); California: Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 13301-14901;
Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 55 138-4-1 to -73 (1953); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat.
Rev. § 12-340 to -399 (1958); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, 55 1301-1701 (1953);
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either type of death tax is the transfer of property, both taxes are
indirect and need not be apportioned under the Federal Constitu-
tion.5 An estate tax is levied on the privilege of transmitting property
District of Columbia: D.C. Code Ann. §§ 47-1601 to -1620 (1961); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.
Laws §§ 122-1 to -43 (1955); Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 14-401 to -430 (1947); Illinois:
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 375-403b (Smith-Hurd 1954); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. SS
7-2401 to -42 (1953); Iowa: Iowa Code §5 450.1-.96 (1958); Kansas: Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 79-1501 to -1532 (1949); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 140.010-990 (1960); Louisiana:
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:2401-2423 (1950); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 155, §§ 1-69
(1954); Maryland: Md. Ann. Code art. 62A, §§ 1-12, art. 81, §§ 149-93 (1957); Massa-
chusetts: Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 65, §§ 1-36 (1953); Michigan: Mich. Stat. Ann. 5S
7.561-.592(7) (1960); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 291.01-.47 (1962); Missouri:
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 145.010-.350 (1949); Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 91-4401
to -4459 (1947); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-2001 to -2037, §§ 77-2101 to -2107
(1958); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86:1-89 (1955); New Jersey: N.J.
Star. Ann. §§ 54:33-1 to :38A-6 (1960); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-16-1 to
-25 (1953); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-2 to -32 (1958); Ohio: Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 5731.01-.56 (Page 1954); Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 118.005-.990 (1961);
Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§ 2301-2484 (1949); Puerto Rico: P.R. Laws Ann.
tit. 13 §§ 881-905 (1962); Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 44-22-1 to -25 (1956);
South Dakota: S.D. Code §§ 57.2101-.2507 (1939); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§
30-1601 to -1643, §§ 30-1701 to -1720 (1955); Texas: Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. arts. 14.01-.27,
arts. 15.01-.16 (1960); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 6501-6952 (1959); Virginia:
Va. Code Ann. §§ 58-152 to -217.14 (1959); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§
83.04.010-98.050 (1962); West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. §5 842-68 (1961); Wisconsin:
Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 72.01-.81 (1957); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-336 to -369
(1959).
All of these jurisdictions, with the exception of Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Dakota,
and West Virginia, also impose an estate tax which is included only for the purpose of ab-
sorbing the state death tax credit under the federal statute. The Revenue Act of 1916, 39
Stat. 777-80, 1002, which forms the basis of the present federal estate tax, Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, §§ 2001-2209, was conceived as an emergency measure in view of the entry of
the United States into the First World War. After the war, the estate tax was attacked on
the ground that the federal government should not invade the death tax field, reserved tra-
ditionally to the states, except in times of emergency. The federal estate tax credit was
introduced to placate the states in order to preserve the federal estate tax. The credit device
was first introduced in the 1924 Act, 43 Stat. 303, and was limited to 25% of the federal
tax. In the 1926 Act, 44 Stat. 70, the credit was increased to 80%.
Under the federal estate tax credit for states, an estate is not permitted to make any
deductions, for federal tax purposes, from the gross estate as a result of state inheritance
taxes. The credit is more favorable than this arrangement; it permits the estate a set-off
against the amount of the federal tax in full. Therefore, if the federal tax were $100,000
and the state inheritance tax were $80,000, the estate would pay the federal government
only $20,000. Thus the states, encouraged by this device, could before 1954 increase their
revenues by increasing their rates, or by imposing a supplemental estate tax, without adding
to the burden of the estate. This result, of course, is based on the states' keeping their
rates within 80% of the federal tax, because the total tax payable by an estate could not
exceed the federal tax before the allowance.
Now, under § 2011 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, a credit is provided for "any estate,
inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes actually paid to any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or any possession of the United States." As to estates of decedents dying
on or after August 17, 1954, § 2011(b) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 provides a schedule
for maximum credits for state taxes for estates of various sizes, in place of the former
80% credit.
5Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 545
(1921) (modern federal estate tax); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (old federal
inheritance tax). In Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925), the Court held that
federal and state death duties could be imposed on the same subject at the same time. See
generally Lowndes, Current Constitutional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 Vand. L. Rev.
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at death and is based generally on the size of the decedent's estate.'
On the other hand, an inheritance tax is imposed upon the privilege
of succeeding to property upon a decedent's death7 and is usually
computed according to the beneficiary's share and his relationship to
the decedent. An inheritance tax, such as Texas Tax.-Gen. art.
14.01,8 presents difficult problems of evaluating the interest of each
beneficiary; whereas, an estate tax is easier to administer since it
depends only upon the size of the decedent's estate.' An application
of both types of taxes levied at the same rates will indicate the
greater revenue yielding power of the estate tax. That tax is an
effective instrument to promote the dispersion of great concentra-
tions of wealth. A similar result is often achieved by the inheritance
tax, since it encourages people to divide their estates and thereby
minimize the revenue burden on any one beneficiary. Because the
estate tax falls upon the decedent's estate, it often frustrates attempts
to provide for dependents and relatives. In contrast, the inheritance
tax is more equitable in that it proportionately burdens those who
benefit from the decedent's estate.1" By adopting the inheritance tax
469 (1951); Lowndes, The Constitutionality of the Federal Estate Tax, 20 Va. L. Rev. 141
(1933).
6 United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960
(1960); Commissioner v. Clise, 122 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 821 (1941);
Central Trust Co. v. James, 120 W. Va. 611, 199 S.E. 881 (1938). Even under the federal
estate tax the beneficiary's relationship to the decedent and the size of the share affect the
amount of tax if the beneficiary is the decedent's spouse and the marital deduction is in-
volved. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056.
'Cahn v. Calvert, 159 Tex. 385, 321 S.W.2d 869 (1959); State v. Hogg, 123 Tex.
568, 72 S.W.2d 593 (1934); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
STex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1960). Article 14.01 is identical to former Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 7117 (1925). The Texas inheritance tax is a special tax upon a beneficiary's
privilege of succession to property either by will or intestacy and is not levied upon the
property which constitutes the decedent's estate. State v. Hogg, 123 Tex. 568, 72 S.W.2d
593 (1934); State v. Jones, 290 S.W. 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), rev'd on other grounds,
5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Dodge v. Youngblood, 245 S.W. 225 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1922); Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Lewis
v. O'Hair, 130 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
" In the case of the federal estate tax, the various items in the gross estate must be
valued. Frequently, the interest of a particular beneficiary and a future interest must be
evaluated, as when a decedent leaves a remainder to charity. Also, if the tax is to be paid
out of the shares of the beneficiaries of the estate instead of out of the residue, their shares
must be appraised to prorate the tax burden. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055.
"°Myers, The Ending of Hereditary American Fortunes (1939); Hall, Incidence of
Death Duties, 30 Am. Econ. Rev. 46 (1940). In the absence of some effective provision to
the contrary, the federal estate tax is payable out of the residue of the estate. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2205. In order to overcome the potentially inequitable consequences of this pro-
vision some states have enacted statutes which provide that in the absence of a direction
in the will to the contrary, the federal estate tax "shall be equitably prorated among the
persons interested in the estate." See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 63-150 (1948); Md. Ann. Code art.
81, § 162 (1957). Such statutes were upheld in Riggs v. del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
For a discussion of a general federal provision for apportionment of the estate tax, see
Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 153 (1948); La Plante,
Proration of Estate Taxes in Connecticut, 33 Conn. B.J. 397 (1960); Lauritzen, Apportion-
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as the means of death taxation, a majority of the common law
states1' as well as almost all of the community property states" have
recognized this equitable feature of the inheritance tax.
In Texas" and other community property states 4 each spouse has
a vested interest in one-half of the entire community estate. The
wife acquires title to her share by virtue of her legal interest in the
property, which attaches at the time of its acquisition." In Texas,
despite the husband's exclusive power to manage and control the
community estate, his power of testamentary disposition is limited
to his one-half interest. Upon the husband's death the wife is not
only vested with full management and control over what was pre-
viously her community interest, but the community estate itself is
terminated, thus extinguishing any rights the husband or his estate
may have had in the wife's community share.' As survivor of the
community, the widow is entitled to her one-half interest, not by
virtue of the decedent's will but because of her previously vested
right in that one-half share. The widow's property rights are
ment of Federal Estate Taxes, I Tax Counsellor's Q. No. 2, at 55 (1957); Mitnick, State
Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 10 Md. L. Rev. 289 (1949).
" See note 4 supra.
12 The community property states using an inheritance tax are California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington. See note 4 supra for a list of the statutes.
saDakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); George v. Taylor, 296
S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163
S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. See generally de Funiak, Principles of Com-
munity Property (1943); Huie, Some Principles of Texas Community Property Law 115
(Charmatz & Daggett ed. 1955).
14Arizona: Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930); La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15
Ariz. 200, 137 Pac. 426 (1914); California: Prior to 1927 the wife had only an "ex-
pectancy" in the community property, but since that time she has been considered the
owner of an undivided half interest. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931) (post-
1927); United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926) (pre-1927); Cal. Civ. Code §
161a; Idaho: Peterson v. Peterson, 35 Idaho 470, 207 Pac. 425 (1922); Ewald v. Hufton,
31 Idaho 373, 173 Pac. 247 (1918); Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258, 121 Pac. 544 (1912);
Louisiana: Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930); Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107
So. 584 (1926); Nevada: In Te Williams' Estate, 40 Nev. 241, 161 Pac. 741 (1916); New
Mexico: Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 Pac. 780 (1919); Washington: Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U.S. 101 (1930).
'" United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367 (1945); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959) (construing Texas
law); Bacon v. Hopkins, 27 F.2d 140 (N.D. Tex. 1928) (construing Tex. Const. art.
16, § 15); Hall v. Hall, 241 S.W. 624 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
"SSmith v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126 (1892); Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 732, 743 (1858);
Verhalen v. Klein, 268 S.W. 975 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 2578 (1951).
I' Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Hamilton, 314 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Smitheal v. Smith, 31 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895);
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960).
"SKemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1953); Jones v. State,
5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); King v. Morris, 1 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Comm. App.
1928).
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secured further by several presumptions relating to the interpretation
of wills. Texas courts interpret the testator's will on the basic pre-
sumption that the testator meant to dispose only of his own property,
which excludes the widow's one-half interest in the community estate,
or of his interest in property owned in common with another person."
In order for a will to be given the effect of an attempted disposition
of property not owned by the testator, such as the widow's share of
the community, that presumption must be overcome by clear, con-
clusive language to that effect."0
With a few constitutional exceptions,2 Texas2 prohibits contracts
which "alter the legal orders of descent." 3 However, even though
it is not an express exception to the prohibition, the doctrine of
election makes possible the decedent's disposition of the entire com-
munity if the survivor elects under the will to take property in lieu
of the relinquished community share." Because the testator with-
draws an interest of the electing spouse, he must make some pro-
vision for the survivor from his share of the community estate or
from his separate property.2 The widow's election to take property
in lieu of her community share constitutes a surrender of that share
and a consent for it to pass by the terms of the decedent's will. Thus,
the widow's election is essential to effectuate the decedent's devise
of the widow's community share to beneficiaries.
In view of the possibly deceptive tenor of the opinions of the
19Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 302, 192 S.W. 542, 544 (1917); Long v. Long,
252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; Ellis v. Scott, 58 S.W.2d 194
(Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
"o In Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 913 (1959), Judge Wisdom summarized the relevant Texas law as follows:
1. A presumption exists that a testator intends to dispose of his property only.
2. Only where the testator's intention to dispose of property that is not his
own is shown by clear and unequivocal language is a husband's will con-
strued to devise his wife's property.
3. The language of the will must be susceptible of no other construction.
4. Use of the first person singular pronoun shows an intention to dispose of
the testator's property only.
5. The will must give some benefit to replace the property surrendered by the
election. 259 F.2d at 240.
2" Tex. Const. art. 16, 5 15.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1960).
" See generally Wren, Recent Texas Statutes Affecting Estate Planning, 15 Sw. L.J. 479,
484 (1961); Comment, Hailey, Hilley, and House Bill 670, 15 Sw. L.J. 613 (1961); Com-
ment, The Widow's Election, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 126-32 (1961).
"4De Funiak, Community Property 217 (1943). See generally Comment, 6 Baylor L.
Rev. 84 (1953); Comment, The Widow's Election, 15 Sw. L.J. 85 (1961).
"The will must give the donee "some free disposable property" which can become
"compensation for what the testator sought to take away," and the benefit must be a ma-
terial one. Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043, 1046 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); sep Delevan
v. Thom, 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
"Mayo v. Tudor's Heirs, 74 Tex. 471, 12 S.W. 117 (1889).
court of civil appeals' and the supreme court in the principal
case," it is emphasized that Calvert v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank does
not involve the widow's tax liability which arises when she receives
her community share, or property in lieu of her community share, as
a result of the testator's death. It is established law in Texas that
there is no inheritance tax levied if the widow receives her com-
munity share, or property in lieu of such share, by virtue of her
election to take under a will disposing of the entire community
estate." This view has been followed by the Attorney General of
Texas consistently"0 and was conceded by the Comptroller in the
present case." It is also uncontroverted that upon the death of one
spouse only his separate property and his one-half interest in the
community are subject to the Texas inheritance tax. 2 However, the
proper method for computing the tax liability of beneficiaries re-
ceiving property under a will as a result of the election of the owner
of such property to accept under the will has been in a state of con-
fusion because of the conflicting opinions of the various Texas
Attorneys General. 3 Thus, the instant case resolved for the first time
in Texas an issue previously considered only by the Attorneys Gen-
eral: the inheritance tax liability of beneficiaries of a will which dis-
poses of the entire community estate with the result that the widow's
one-half community share passes to such beneficiaries upon her elec-
tion to take under the will.
In arriving at a solution, the supreme court relied'M upon Jones v.
State"s and Bethea v. Sheppard."6 The Jones case involved a husband's
bequest of certain property to his wife with the stipulation that the
same was in lieu of her entire community interest. As the result of
27 348 S.W.2d at 19.
28356 S.W.2d at 919.
2Hansen v. Blackmon, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943); Jones v. State, 5
S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); Bethea v. Sheppard, 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940) error ref.
" Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen.: No. WW-1013 (March 13, 1961); No. WW-698 (Sept. 9,
1959); No. S-177 (Sept. 30, 1955); No. V-914 (Sept. 27, 1949); No. 0-5063 (Dec. 13,
1943); No. 0-5211 (May 15, 1943); No. 0-2819 (Oct. 30, 1940).
3' 356 S.W.2d at 920. The court stated: "No tax was assessed against Mrs. Taylor [the
widow] for the reason . . . that she did not receive more than her community interest plus
the $25,000.00 statutory exemption."
aa See note 30 supra for the Attorney General's recognition of this result.
" Ops. Tex. Att'y Gen.: No. 0-4109 (Oct. 22, 1941) (widow's relinquished community
share included in computation of beneficiary's tax liability); No. V-704 (Oct. 21, 1948)
(widow's community share not included in computation); No. V-1146 (Jan. 24, 1951)
(widow's community share not included in computation); No. WW-343 (Jan. 22, 1958)
(widow's community share included in computation, overruling Ops. V-704 and V-1146,
reinstating 0-4109).
4 3 5 6 S.W.2d at 921-22.
'5 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
31 143 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error ref.
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the widow's election to take the bequest, the value of which was less
than her community interest plus the statutory exemption, it was
held that the will effected only a partition between the widow and
the other beneficiaries and that no property passed to her within the
contemplation of the Texas inheritance tax statute. The supreme
court in the instant case specifically pointed out that the issue of
the tax liability of testamentary beneficiaries who receive part of the
widow's community interest as a result of her election was not
reached in the Jones case.
In the Bethea case, Henry Henke and his wife Catherine executed
a joint will and trust agreement which provided that the entire
community estate should pass to a named trustee in the event the
husband died first. Mrs. Henke and a daughter were to receive
specified annual payments from the trust during the lifetime of
the former, and the payments to the daughter were to be increased
and continued for eight years after Mrs. Henke's death. At the end
of that period the corpus of the trust was to be distributed to the
daughter if she were alive, but if the daughter were not living at that
time, the property was to be held in trust for an additional five years
and then delivered to the daughter's children. The husband died
first, and an inheritance tax was paid on his half of the community
estate. Upon the subsequent death of Mrs. Henke it was held that
the right of the daughter to succeed to her mother's community
interest was taxable as a transfer by Mrs. Henke made or intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death. In comparing
the Bethea case with the principal case the supreme court stated:
A necessary corollary of that holding is the proposition that Mrs.
Henke's community interest did not pass by Mr. Henke's will within
the meaning of the inheritance tax statutes. There the wife consented
in advance for her half of the community property to be placed in
trust as directed by the husband's will. Here the same result is
accomplished by the widow's election to accept under the will sub-
sequent to the death of the husband. We cannot believe that the
Legislature intended to tax the one transaction as an inter vivos
transfer by the consenting wife and the other as a passage of title by
the husband's will.
3 8
The cases, including other decisions" involving the Texas inherit-
ance tax, are based upon three theories: (1) the decedent did not
S3 56 S.W.2d at 922.
38 Ibid. In conjunction with the instant case it should be noted that the court did not
pass on the question of whether the right to succeed to the widow's interest was taxable
as a transfer made by her in contemplation of death or intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment after death. 356 S.W.2d at 922.
3 See cases cited note 29 supra.
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own the devised property at the time of his death; (2) the passing
of property under a will is not a passing within the meaning of the
tax statute if the owner could have taken the property tax-exempt
in the absence of such a will; and (3) the designation of property
which, by the terms of the will, is to be transferred to a beneficiary
is not necessarily a passing of such property for inheritance tax
purposes. These recognized considerations, in determining the con-
cept of property passing within the meaning of the tax statute,
clashed with the Comptroller's argument. He had urged that upon
the widow's election to accept the disposition made by her husband's
will, she and the other beneficiaries took under the will with the
legal result that her community interest passed under the will as if
it had always belonged to the testator." The supreme court rejected
this argument by differentiating between the "passing" of property
for inheritance tax purposes and the "passing" of property as a
consequence of the widow's election in title controversies between
the widow or her heirs and the other beneficiaries of the will.41
In addition to relying on cases involving the problem of property
"passing" for inheritance tax purposes, the court interpreted the
inheritance tax statute2 in the light of prevailing principles of com-
munity property. After noting that the only property ordinarily
regarded as passing by will or descent was property owned by the
testator, the court referred to the statutory limitation on the state's
power to tax the succession to property not owned by the decedent
at the time of his death." The court felt that to extend the state's
powers beyond these enumerated statutory provisions would be in
clear violation of accepted rules of statutory interpretation." It is
universally recognized that a special tax such as the inheritance tax
must be strictly construed against the government, that the sovereign
is bound to express its intention to tax in clear and unambiguous
language, and that in case of doubt all presumptions of interpreta-
tion are in favor of the taxpayer.
4 356 S.W.2d at 922. The court of civil appeals also rejected the Comptroller's position.
348 S.W.2d at 25.
41 356 S.W.2d at 922.
42 Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1960).
43356 S.W.2d at 921.
"Ibid. Tex. Tax-Gen. Ann. art. 14.01 (1960) taxes, inter alia, (1) property which
passes under a general power of appointment, (2) certain life insurance proceeds, (3) trans-
fers made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after death, and (4) transfers
in contemplation of death.
" Cf. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578 (1902) (sovereign is bound to express its
intention to tax in clear and unambiguous language); Estate of Gates, 243 N.Y. 193, 153
N.E. 45 (1926); Lewis v. O'Hair, 130 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
4"28 Am. Jur. Inheritance, Estate, Succession and Gift Taxes § 47, at 50 (1959), cited
by the supreme court, 356 S.W.2d at 921.
1963 ] NOTES
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Finally, the court gave effective recognition to one concomitant of
the community property system and the presumptions relating to the
interpretation of wills, namely, the widow's power to defeat the terms
of her husband's will to the extent that it purports to dispose of her
property." Thus, at the time of a testator's death, regardless of
whether the will disposes of the entire community or not, the state
is without power to levy a tax on the widow's share. It is the widow's
election to take under the will which creates the beneficiary's privilege
of succession to property; absent the election, the decedent's dis-
position of the widow's share is void. Though the terms of a will
do pass the widow's share to beneficiaries for purposes of ownership
and title controversies," such is not the "passing of property" con-
templated by the Texas inheritance tax statute.
It is interesting to compare the holding in the present case with
the federal estate tax consequences that would result in an identical
situation. Taxation of a decedent's estate under the federal estate
tax rests upon the taxing of transfers by will and intestacy." For
this purpose the taxable estate is the decedent's gross estate, which
includes all of his separate property and his share of the community
property.' Hence, under the present federal estate tax the widow's
community share is not included in the husband's gross estate." Even
47 Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Munger v.
Munger, 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
48 356 S.W.2d at 922.
41 Ibid. The court implied that in the absence of the widow's election made after the
husband's death, the widow's share could not pass by the will. The court here relied on
the analysis of Falknor in Liability of the Entire Community Estate for the Payment of
State Inheritance Tax Where Husband Undertakes To Dispose of Entire Community Estate
by Will and Wife Elects To Take Under the Will, 5 Wash. L. Rev. 55 (1930).
" Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 2001.
51 Section 2033 provides: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property . . . to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death."
Section 2051 provides that, except for certain exemptions and deductions, the taxable estate
is the gross estate of the decedent.
In the federal estate tax cases, attention is directed to the composition of the decedent's
gross estate since this indicates what is taxed at the time of his death. United States v.
Stewart, 270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960); Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913
(1959); Estate of Bluestein, 15 T.C. 770 (1950); In re Buckhantz' Estate, 120 Cal. App. 2d
92, 260 P.2d 794 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
"ZThis has not always been the case. In the periods prior to 1942 and after 1948, only
the decedent's half interest in the community was includible in his gross estate for estate
tax purposes; that is, local law was followed in taxing community property. Lang's Estate
v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Greenwood v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 915 (9th
Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. Cadwallader, 127 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v.
Goodyear, 99 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1938); Wardell v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226 (9th Cir. 1921),
cert. denied, 258 U.S. 617 (1921).
However, from 1942 to 1948 the interest of the surviving spouse in the community
property was included in the gross estate of the deceased spouse pursuant to an amendment
of 1942. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811 (e) (2), 56 Stat. 798 (1942). See Rompel v. United
States, 326 U.S. 367 (1945); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Steen v. United
[Vol. 17
NOTES
if the widow elects to take under a will disposing of her community
share, as in the principal case, the decedent's taxable gross estate does
not contain the widow's relinquished community property. 3 If the
widow's election were to cause her property to be included in the
decedent's estate, community property state residents would be sub-
ject to the same federal tax consequences as those which existed
from 1942 to 1948. Consequently, the tax exemption of the com-
munity share that is relinquished by the electing spouse and devised
to beneficiaries under the decedent's will is in harmony with the
basic purpose of the 1948 Revenue Act, which was to remove pre-
1948 discriminations against community property states."
The Comptroller's proposed application of the Texas inheritance
tax statute would have precipitated several absurd consequences.
First, an interpretation upholding the tax on the theory that the
decedent's testamentary disposition was the effective legal act by
which the beneficiaries took the widow's share would have extended
the decedent's power of disposition to property not owned by him
during his lifetime. That construction would have contravened well-
established limitations on such a power5 and would have been tanta-
mount to the abrogation of the rights of the spouse as wife or widow
under the community property system. Second, the imposition of
the inheritance tax on the theory that the widow's election was the
legally effective act by which property passed to the beneficiaries
would clearly have involved the taxation of the succession to prop-
erty belonging to a living person." Finally, under the Comptroller's
theory, it could be argued that when the decedent made provision
States, 195 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1952). When the Revenue Act of 1948 restored the estate
tax advantage to community property owners by reinstating the law of the pre-1942 period,
the common law state residents were permitted to "split" the estate on the death of one of
the spouses by exempting the property passing to the surviving spouse in an amount up
to one-half of the total estate.
53Pre-1942 cases: Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939); Roland I. Smith, 8 P-H
B.T.A. Mem. 707 (1939), G.C.M. 7773, XI-2 Cum. Bull. 426 (1930); Coffman-Dobson
Bank & Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930), acq., X-I Cum. Bull. 13 (1931).
1942-1948: During this period the question under discussion was moot since the federal
estate tax held the widow's community share includible anyway.
Post-1948: Stapf v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 830, 837 (N.D. Tex. 1960), rev'd on
other grounds, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962); Zillah Mae Turman, 35 T.C. 1123 (1961).
See generally Brookes, The Tax Consequences of Widow's Election in Community Property
States, 1951 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 83, 99; Christian, Tax Aspects of Widow's Election, 1 Ariz.
L. Rev. 105 (1959); Nossamann, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes Upon the Disposition
of Community Property, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 71, 74 (1930); Wren, Estate Planning and the
Widow's Election, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 281 (1962); Wren, The Widow's Election, 100
Trusts & Estates 13, 108 (1961).
"Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 Harv. L. Rev.
1097, 1150 (1948).
" See text accompanying note 16 supra on the husband's limited power of testamentary
disposition.
" See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1900).
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for the widow to take property in lieu of her relinquished com-
munity share, the transaction was to be viewed as the decedent's post-
humous acquisition of property of which he disposed during his life-
time. Such a transformation of the ownership of property cannot
be supported in view of recognized principles of the law of wills."
The only justifiable means of obtaining revenue from such a
testamentary arrangement as the one in the instant case could be
based upon the theory of a gift to the beneficiaries. This theory, how-
ever, would involve the taxation of the widow and not of the
beneficiaries and could be justified only by legislation-not by
judicial fiat."s
Despite the soundness of the decision, the theory that the property
did not "pass" for purposes of the inheritance tax statute left at
large the crucial point of who owned the property to which the
beneficiaries succeeded. Having recognized that the widow's com-
munity share was not owned by the testator at the time of his death
on community property principles, the court also upheld the validity
of the consequences of the widow's election to take under a dece-
dent's will. This meant that at the moment of the election to take
under the will in the instant case, the property that "passed" to the
trustee for the beneficiaries was not owned either by the decedent's
estate or by the surviving spouse. Thus, although there was no
"passing" of property for inheritance tax purposes, it is not clear
whose property the beneficiaries are deemed to have received. How-
ever, the decision does indicate that it is sufficient to show that the
property received by beneficiaries as a result of a widow's election
to take under a will disposing of her community share is not property
which belonged to the decedent at the time of his death.
Hellmut A. Erwing
" Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §5 8 (1956) provides for the passing of interests under a will
of all the estate, right, title, and interest in possession, expectancy, reversion, or remainder,
which the testator has or at the time of his death shall have. See Turner v. Montgomery,
293 S.W. 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927); Grigsby's Legatees v. Willis' Estate, 59 S.W. 574
(Tex. Civ. App. 1900) error ref. Former art. 8282 of Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925) provided
that an individual was empowered to dispose by will of every estate or interest which, in
the absence of a will, would pass to his heirs or next of kin. See Baker v. Johnson, 64
S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
" Texas has no gift tax statute.
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